Declining Debate

I have noticed that when debating atheists, after a little back-and-forth, they bow out, unwilling to further justify their beliefs.

There are a couple plausible explanation for this practice:

 a) Perhaps I am really too annoying to carry on a dialogue with. Perhaps I fail to address or take seriously the arguments of my adversaries. Although I strongly disagree with this explanation, I understand that my bias for my own capabilities may be blinding me from my own flaws; thus, I mention this as a possible explanation.

b) Atheists' have an inner sense that their position is actually untenable. Through debate, they become, consciously or subconsciously, aware of the fact that their initial confidence cannot be justified. This irks them and pains, and this pain compels them to stop debating.

c) Atheists are supremely confident that their position is right. When debating a religious person, they have the attitude that they are debating a foaming-at-the-mouth nutcase who really isn't worth their time, patience and efforts.

I suspect that "option c" is the most plausible reason for their reluctance to continue debating. And I believe that it is a lamentable explanation. Indeed, if nothing else, atheists owe it to their ancestors to continue subjecting their beliefs to scrutiny and debate. Never, ever be overconfident about your beliefs. Humans are extremely fallible and history tells us that each generation believes that it is "reasonable" and "rational" when compared to the the earlier ones. We should avoid such confidence and we should continue debating and subjecting our beliefs to debate. That is the only way to come closer to the truth.

Are Kuzari Critics Familiar with the Kuzari Argument?

Below is a presentation, by a Kuzari critic (Second Son) of the various formulations of the Kuzari argument, broken down into premises and conclusions. While it might be an accurate display of what many believe is the Kuzari argument - and so I cannot blame the author for presenting it in his way - I personally have never understood the Kuzari argument as such. In fact, I actually disagree with every single premise that he presents, though I am (obviously) a staunch proponent of the Kuzari argument. This leads me to believe that some critics of the argument are not familiar with the Kuzari argument (as I understand it).

BELOW IS A PRESENTATION OF THE KUZARI ARGUMENT BY THE SECOND SON:

The Kuzari argument as a a series of syllogisms:

Premise 1: Either Matan Torah happened as recorded in the Torah, or someone made it up. As worded, I disagree with the premise.
Premise 2: Millions of people will not accept that they or millions of their ancestors witnessed something and that there was a continuous tradition about that event unless they had heard about the event from their parents (or other elder family members). They would have rejected the claim out of hand. I disagree with this premise.
Conclusion 1: Therefore it can't be that Matan Torah and the mesorah were  made up, because no one would have accepted it. I disagree with this conclusion.

Premise 3:  If it were possible for mass revelation events to be faked or to develop organically, we would expect more religions to use a mass revelation as their origin stories. Although it is an interesting observation, I disagree with this premise.
Premise 4:  We don't see any other religions use a a story like matan Torah: a mass revelation to the entire nation that was passed on to the descendants of the original witnesses as their origin story. As worded, I disagree with this premise.
Conclusion 2: Therefore it must be that mass revelation stories can't be faked or develop organically, and the mass revelation at Har Sinia must be a real event. I disagree with this conclusion.

Premise 5: (From C1 and C2) We can be sure that matan Torah happened, just as we are sure that other historical events happened. As worded, I disagree with this premise.
Premise 6:  If Hashem gave the Torah on Har Sinia, then Judaism is true and all Jews are obligated in the mitzvos. Maybe I'm nitpicking, but I disagree with this premise, unless it is substantiated with additional arguments.
Conclusion 3:  Therefore Judaism is true and all Jews are obligated in the mitzvos. Although I agree with this conclusion, I disagree that this conclusion can be substantiated by the Kuzari argument.
The argument as a syllogism with all sub-premises:
Premise 1: Either Matan Torah happened as recorded in the Torah, or someone made it up. I disagree with this premise.
                Sub-premise A: If it was made up, someone tried to convince everyone that it is true, like a guy standing on a soapbox in the street. I disagree with this sub-premise.
Premise 2: Millions of people will not accept that they or millions of their ancestors witnessed something and that there was a continuous tradition about that event unless they had heard about the event from their parents (or other elder family members). They would have rejected the claim out of hand. I disagree with this premise.
                Sub-premise A: There were millions of witnesses at  matan Torah. I disagree with this sub-premise.
                Sub-premise B: The millions of witnesses at matan Torah passed down their experiences to
their children through the generations, giving us millions of lines of faithful witness that matan Torah happened. Thought historically correct, the Kuzari argument is not based on and has no connection with this sub-premise.
                Sub-premise C: Each link in the chain of the mesorah is equally reliable. I disagree with this Sub-premise.
                Sub-premise D: There is an unbroken mesorah that proves  matan torah was a real event, and the mesorah is valid. I disagree with this sub-premise.
                Sub-premise E: The first generation would have had to believe they experienced matan Torah for them to tell the story to their children as history.  People are/were aware of history as such and valued it. Family and community elders wouldn't deliberately lie or distort the history they pass to their children in the service of what they regard as a greater religious good. And the first generation wasn't forced to accept the story and pass it on as truth to their kids. I disagree with this sub-premise.
                Sub-premise F: people in the distant past were skeptical in the same way that people are today, (thought the same way about things as people do today) and so would have rejected the Sinia story if it wasn't true. I disagree with this sub-premise.
                Sub-premise G: Large numbers of people can't become convinced they (or their ancestors) witnessed something if it didn't really happen. I disagree with this sub-premise.
                Sub-premise H: The people saw God give the Torah,  not some sort of trick. While factually true, I disagree that the Kuzari argument is based upon this premise.
                Sub-premise I: It is reasonable to accept other people's testimony that they have witnessed a miracle. I agree with this sub-premise, although I don't believe that the Kuzari argument is based upon this sub-premise.
Conclusion 1: Therefore it can't be that Matan Torah and the mesorah were  made up, because no one would have accepted it. I disagree with this conclusion.

Premise 3:  If it were possible for mass revelation events to be faked or to develop organically, we would expect more religions to use a mass revelation as their origin stories. I disagree with this premise.
                Sub-premise A: Religions (except Judaism, which is the truth) are invented by charlatans who are looking to use the best justification, or religions will naturally develop the best justification. I disagree with this sub-premise.
                Sub-premise B: Mass revelation is the best, or at least a very good, justification for a religion, so we would expect more religions to use it. I disagree with this sub-premise.
Premise 4:  We don't see any other religions use a a story like matan Torah: a mass revelation to the entire nation that was passed on to the descendants of the original witnesses as their origin story. ( R' Gottlieb's NET.) As worded, I disagree with this premise.
                Sub-premise A: The uniqueness of the Sinai story is proof that it happened, because it shows that a story like matan Torah can't be made up or evolve through myth formation. I disagree with this sub-premise.
                Sub-premise B: There are no mass revelations in other religious traditions comparable to matan Torah. As worded, I disagree with this sub-premise.
Conclusion 2: Therefore it must be that mass revelation stories can't be faked or develop organically, and the mass revelation at Har Sinia must be a real event. I disagree with this conclusion.
Premise 5: (From C1 and C2) We can be sure that matan Torah happened, just as we are sure that other historical events happened. As worded, I disagree with this conclusion.
                Sub-premise A: The Kuzari Proof establishes the historicity of matan Torah in the same way and with the same or similar confidence as other events we consider historical (having actually happened). I disagree with this sub-premise.
Premise 6:  If Hashem gave the Torah on Har Sinia, then Judaism is true and all Jews are obligated in the mitzvos. As worded, I disagree with this premise.
                Sub-premise A: There is a solid mesorah about what  our ancestors witnessed at matan Torah. Although true, I disagree that this is a necessary premise of the Kuzari argument.
                Sub-premise B: If matan Torah was a real event, then the Torah we have today is the Word of God and Judaism as it is now is obligatory. I disagree that this is a sub-premise of the Kuzari argument and I disagree that the Kuzari argument is sufficient to justify this sub-premise.
                Sub-premise C: People will not accept new doctrines as binding unless it is attested to through mesorah. Jews have accepted the burdensome commandments in the Torah and subsequent halacha unless matan Torah really happened. I disagree with this premise.
Conclusion 3:  Therefore Judaism is true and all Jews are obligated in the mitzvos. I disagree with this conclusion. Although I agree with this conclusion, I disagree that this conclusion can be substantiated by the Kuzari argument alone.

Responding to Baruch Pelta's Critiques of the Kuzari Argument

Ari Mandel's shtick (he admitted as much in a podcast), whenever presented with a Kuzari proponent seeking to debate, is to refer the proponent to Google. In other words, Ari feels that it's unnecessary to debate the Kuzari argument, as mere Google results prove that the Kuzari argument is a flawed argument. Specifically, he referred me to Baruch Pelta's critiques (which I have long been aware of). Thus, I feel compelled to outline the flaws presented in Baruch Pelta's argument: 

 1) Pelta's first criticism of the Kuzari argument is that Kuzari proponents can't present a single example of a society rejecting a false national belief. If so, argues Pelta, how can we assume that a nation would necessarily reject a false national belief. 

Flaw: Pelta is inappropriately shifting the burden of Proof. Kuzari proponents do not argue that it is impossible, or even unlikely, to convince a population to accept a false national history. Rather, it is the atheist or Kuzari-critic who claims that national history is a fallible form of evidence; it is the atheist who is asserting that you CAN convince a population to accept a false history. Indeed, all the Kuzari proponent is merely asserting is the following: our tradition is a form of evidence which we have no reason to ASSUME is fallible. Thus, it is the Kuzari critic, who ASSERTS that our tradition is fallible, to show a false belief about a national event. Until he does so, we must admit that we simply do not know whether national tradition is a fallible form of evidence. (How we go from an agnostic position to actual belief is for another post, though it is probably obvious to the reader).

 2) Pelta's second criticism is that the Torah appears to be a "very" human document. 

Flaw #1: even if we assume that, G-d forbid, the Torah was written by humans, that does not imply that the national miracles did not happen. While the Torah being a human document would certainly contradict Judaism, it does not FORCE us to conclude that the miracles at Sinai did not happen. Thus, while Pelta's critique is a relevant objection to traditional Judaism, it does not seem directly relevant to the Kuzari argument. Flaw #2: Pelta irrationally assumes that God could not or would not write a particular book. Pelta assumes that "of course" God would not write a book which could have or, theoretically, would have been written by humans. He presents no evidence whatsoever that God would not write a book like the Torah, a book that (perhaps) looks like it was written by humans. As his assertion is based purely on blind faith, I need not rebut it. Indeed, his argument mimics Sam Harris's argument, and it based on presuming what type of book God would write (though, as a matter of fact, even if his argument was a logical one, if one delves deeply into the Torah one could justify why an Omniscient Being would write such a book, but, again, the basis of his argument is unfounded, and thus there is no need to respond to it). 

 3) Pelta's third criticism of the Kuzari argument is that passages in the Tanach appear to imply that the Torah did not appear on the scene until the times of Ezra and Nechemia. 

Flaw: there is absolutely no evidence that the population was unaware of the Sinai miracles. Though there are numerous flaws (and baseless assumptions) in Pelta's argument, his argument is irrelevant from the get-go: we are arguing that one can't convince a population regarding a false national event (the Sinai miracles). EVEN IF, the population was unaware of the Torah (there is no evidence of that from the text, BTW), or that the population near Ezra hadn't observed Succos (there is little evidence for that from the text), that is irrelevant to HIS CLAIM that one could CERTAINLY foist BELIEF in a false national EVENT upon the population. 

The remaining flaws are so numerous, that "אי אפשר לפרטם כי רבים הם")

4)  Pelta's fourth criticism of the Kuzari argument is that it arbitrarily (without "mathematical" justification) asserts that only counterexamples of more than 100,000 are sufficient to disprove the Kuzari argument. 

Flaw: Pelta once again misconstrues the Kuzari argument and the burden of proof. When one argues, as the Kuzari critic does, that national history is fallible, he needs to show that it was surely possible to convince the Jewish people of the false events recorded in the Torah. Now, according to the Torah, millions of people witnessed the Sinai events, which would have created millions of general lines to subsequent generations. Essentially, the Kuzari critic is asserting that one can convince a population of a non-event which should have created millions of direct OR INDIRECT witnesses (the subsequent descendants of those witnesses). That is a considerable assumption that the critic is making, that a population would be so barbarous to believe in such a non-event that should have been so easily refutable. As the burden is squarely on the critic (see paragraph #1 above, where I argued that the Kuzari proponent does not claim that the evidence is infallible, and thus does not assume ANY burden), it is upon the critic to present some evidence that our evidence is fallible. In order to do so, he needs to present SIMILAR evidence which has shown itself to be fallible. Now, there is some grey area here, since there are some forms of evidence which may be somewhat similar. But we can pretty confidently assert that when the evidence is less than a THIRTIETH of the evidence for the Torah, it is not remotely similar to the evidence for Torah. So, if the only example of people believing in a "national" event is an event which included less than 100,000 people (compared to the Torah which contained as many as three million people), we have no evidence that the evidence for the Torah is fallible. 

 5) Pelta's fifth criticism of the Kuzari argument is that the the Aztec migration myth present a valid counterexample. 

There are numerous flaws here. And I have displayed the irrelevance of the Aztec myth numerous times online (go google them). But paragraph #4 above sufficiently rebuts the Aztec migration myth by itself, as the myth does not assert how many witnesses were on the migration and so it is completely irrelevant to the Kuzari argument which had millions of witnesses and would have created millions of generational lines to subsequent generations.

6) Pelta's sixth criticism of the Kuzari argument is the fact that we've yet to find evidence of the Jews in the desert despite thoroughly and repeatedly searching it. Flaw: Even if this argument is factual (it isn't), it is not sufficient to rebut to the Kuzari argument. If the evidence for the Sinai miracles is infallible, we obviously must accept that the Jews were in the desert for 40 years. Indeed, if we'd go back in time and witness the events ourselves, would we pay any attention to archaeological record? Of course not. So the first step for the critic is to show that our evidence is fallible. If he can't, he's toast. (Elsewhere online, I have argued why factually there is no archaeological evidence against the Sinai sojourn).

NOTE TO ALTER COCKER: I AM NOT TRYING TO CONVINCE YOU, MY POST ARE FOR YOUR READERS WHO ARE ON THE FENCE. AS CHAZAL SAY, DON'T TRY TO CONVINCE A JEWISH APIKORIS: We don't have to show that there are no false national events. The burden is on you. We are presenting a form of evidence -- a nationally experienced event which would change the face of the nation perpetually -- and we say that until we find a false event, we have no right to assume that our evidence is fallible. Why do you assume that it it fallible? The fact that there are no miraculous national events doesn't imply that our evidence is fallible. If you were standing at Sinai, and you'd experience the miracles, would you doubt your experience of eating the manna for 40 years because other examples of people experiencing miracles aren't recorded? The point is that if we are presenting evidence that may be infallible, it is only your wishful thinking that allows you to ignore it. I mean, think about it. The Beis Hamikdash, specifically the Second one. Its existence changed our nation forever. Its existence is seared in our collective memory. It left at least two yearly commemorations -- Tisha B'av and Chanukah -- in its wake. Arguing against Sinai is like arguing against the existence of the Temple: utter nonsense. I pinned a chapter to my twitter account which you may be interested in. NOTE: IT IS ONLY A VERY SMALL SLICE OF THE ARGUMENT.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B1hLl6wqz6VTSS0xYzdXSUdOc2s/view?usp=sharing

http://www.barefootsworld.net/chanunpa.html

Kuzari Contenders

If you google the "Kuzari proof," you will find a list of sites presenting "contenders" to the Sinai events.

I am not going to point out, at least for now, how these myths aren't relevant to the Kuzari argument, though I believe that they are completely irrelevant. They aren't even close to refuting the Kuzari principle.

Rather, I'd like to point out two important pieces of info:

1) They will, without exception, present NUMEROUS counterexamples. This is odd! Why would they spend so much time researching in order to find numerous myths, when even finding one contender would be sufficient to disprove Kuzari? The answer is obvious. They realize that each one of their "myths," individually, aren't relevant to Kuzari. Thus, they hope that by conglomerating many non-national myths, they can disprove Kuzari (there is strength in numbers, they reason). If you are caught in a debate with one of these folks, the first thing you should demand is that they present ONE counterexample, and only one counterexample. This will allow you to laser in, and it will allow you to expose the patent flaws of the counterexample. When forced to pick one -- and I've used this technique many times -- they often abruptly refuse to continue debating. Their strategy has been exposed.

2) Another amazing phenomenon that I've noticed is how, without any circumspection, they will present a "counterexample." In other words, when they find a "myth," do they take the time to establish whether this myth was actually believed to have happened to the population? Do they take the time to contact and expert in the field? They do not. Rather, it is me -- who isn't obligated to research the counterexample -- who is forced to contact the expert, and then to forward the results to my adversary.

    Why do they rush to their conclusions, tripping over their own feel in the process? It appears that they are desperate, desperately in need of finding that elusive counterexample. But isn't atheism about the truth?